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Abstract
The 2004 antitrust reform is the most important change in the history of EU compe-
tition policy. It amounts to a major shift in both the mode of regulation (towards
private enforcement) and the substance (towards the Anglo-Saxon model). These
changes erode crucial elements of the Rhenish variety of economic organization.
Introduction
The increasing role of private actors in business regulation is an established
topic in discussions about global governance. In the context of the literature
around private authority in international affairs (Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and
Bierstecker, 2002), a wide variety of private regulation and enforcement has
been identified, ranging from voluntary codes for ‘good corporate conduct’ or
technical standardization, to the self-regulation of certain industries. The EU
is among the driving forces of the process towards institutionalizing the role
of private actors in international business regulation. Examples of this are the
private International Financial Reporting Standards and International Stan-
dards on Auditing (Dewing and Russell, 2004), the regulation of the ‘dot.eu’
internet top level domain by Eurid, a private company (Christou and Simpson,
2005), or the launch of Fin-Net, a private Europe-wide out-of-court com-
plaints network for financial services (Ronit, 2005). The current emphasis on
private actors in rule setting and enforcement goes much further than
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traditional lobbying in allowing business a dominating role in EU regulation,
thereby representing a new quality of developments away from public
authority.
In order to conduct an in-depth study of these processes, the 2004 reform
of EU antitrust enforcement is selected as a case study. This reform was
announced as the most radical legal and cultural ‘modernization’ in the
history of European competition policy (Ehlermann, 2000). It came in the
form of a package of both substantial and procedural changes. One of the core
components consists of replacing the more than 40-year-old Regulation 17/62
with Regulation 1/2003. This measure abolished the long-standing adminis-
trative notification regime under which companies could have ensured in
advance through the European Commission that a planned commercial agree-
ment did not fall into the category of a cartel or other restrictive business
practices prohibited under Article 81 (TEC). The main burden of antitrust
enforcement has now shifted to the private sector: the business community
cannot rely anymore on the sanction-free notification procedure, but has to
assess by itself whether a planned economic transaction infringes on the law
or not. In order to correct for wrong assessments, the reforms aimed at
stimulating private enforcement in the form of civil antitrust disputes before
the courts.
In the context of the current ‘privatization’ of important aspects of EU
business regulation, the reform constitutes a crucial case given the central
character of competition policy as ‘the most important organizing principle in
the capitalist world’ (Cini and McGowan, 1998, p. 2). As there is no other
supranational policy field in which the Commission possesses comparable
far-reaching powers, it raises the question of why the Commission has been
inclined to devolve important functions to private actors. Moreover, how can
the implications of this pivotal change in competition law enforcement be
interpreted? In order to evaluate the significance of these developments, the
article suggests understanding the shift towards private enforcement of EU
business regulation with regard to its potential impact on the Rhenish variety
of capitalism. Drawing on the basic distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and
the Rhenish type, the article presumes that each of these capitalist production
systems is characterized by specific comparative advantages and institutional
complementarities, i.e. the elements are interdependent and cannot easily be
changed or transferred (Albert, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Crouch and
Streeck, 1997). Within the EU, the Rhenish variant is still the most wide-
spread model, not only because of the weight of the German economy, but
also because most of the old EU-15 – with the notable exception of the United
Kingdom – can be associated with this form of ‘co-ordinated market econo-
mies’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 19).
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The ‘variety of capitalism’ model is particularly well-suited for assessing
the significance of changes within economic regulation: new regulations have
to be compatible with the basic institutional features of the existing model,
which allows for evaluating the recent antitrust reform within its broader
context. However, its rather static, comparative character is unable to account
for transnational developments, including those forces that threaten to erode
the distinct national models. This erosion – if discussed at all – is mainly
attributed to anonymous market forces of economic and financial globaliza-
tion (Berger and Dore, 1996; Cerny, 1997; Streeck, 1997). The article there-
fore suggests complementing structural explanations with a more actor-based
account. From this perspective, the erosion of the ‘Rhenish variety’ is very
much intensified by current changes in EU business regulation, in particular
the growing reliance on private actors.
The article starts off by discussing the different legal and ideological
traditions of antitrust control by positing them against the background of the
Rhenish versus the Anglo-Saxon way of organizing economic life. Section II
demonstrates that the reform amounts to a major shift in terms of the mode of
regulation (towards private enforcement) and the substance of regulation
(towards the Anglo-Saxon model). Section III unravels the interests of three
important actors that for different reasons have driven this process: the Com-
mission, the legal profession and shareholder rights organizations. The con-
cluding part argues that the privatization of vital components of business
regulation is not only confined to the case of competition control. Comparable
patterns can be identified across a series of issue areas, which are driven by
similar interest coalitions and together tend to erode some crucial elements of
the Rhenish variety of capitalism.
The argument has implications for a range of audiences: the ongoing
reliance on private actors represents a new phenomenon that did not receive
sufficient attention from scholars on EU regulation in general and new
modes of governance in particular. Likewise, debates on transnational
private authority did not tackle the catalysing role of the EU or the reper-
cussions for national capitalist models. Correspondingly, the variety of capi-
talisms literature largely ignored the role of EU regulations as a force of
erosion for the Rhenish model. So have the effects of reforms in specific
policy fields (such as competition policy) on capitalist models as a whole.
Finally, students of EU competition policy may benefit from a politico-
economic assessment of the current reform. Hitherto, the literature on the
new regulation is dominated by epistemic communities with a rather narrow
technical and legalistic focus (with the notable exception of Wilks, 2005).
Through the lens of the variety of capitalisms approach, the magnitude of
ongoing changes can be highlighted.
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I. Antitrust Control and the Variety of Capitalisms
In a nutshell, the Rhenish model is characterized by a fairly balanced and
consensual relationship between labour and capital, the supporting role of the
state and availability of patient capital being provided by major banks (‘Haus-
banken’) or internally generated funds – all features conducive to a relatively
long-term perspective with regard to the economic wellbeing of firms. Stable
ownership and control structures provide firms with considerable protection
against hostile take-overs, which particularly benefits small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). All of these factors are favourable to the long-term
investment in human resource development that is crucial for the Rhenish
specialization in high skill and quality products. Conversely, the Anglo-Saxon
ideal type features more adversarial capital-labour relations, comparatively
short-term employment, a limited role for the state, a predominance of finan-
cial markets for capital provision, an active market for corporate control and
much more emphasis on short-term price movements on stock markets. This
model yields comparative advantages in mass production based on low skills
and low cost, also in sectors with a premium on radical innovation such as
biotechnology or high-end services as inter alia corroborated by the British
production system (Schmidt, 2003, p. 544).
When translating the central features of the ‘Rhenish’ and the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ model of economic organization into the field of competition control,
the distinction between contrasting policy paradigms and different modes of
enforcement is essential.
Competing Paradigms: the Freiburg versus the Chicago School
Competition control is located at the interface between enabling and con-
straining the scope of freedom enjoyed by market players. It constitutes a
sensitive area where a great variety of interests clash. As an instrument of
public market intervention par excellence, it needs to be understood in
terms of established legal and economic philosophies that influence policy
objectives and conceptions of how to interpret and enforce competition law.
With regard to ‘competition’ paradigms, two corresponding schools have
been most influential: the German ordo-liberal school of law and economics
based in Freiburg, which has not only been prominent in post-war Germany,
but also in the setting of the EU, and the Chicago School, which has domi-
nated US antitrust practices from the 1960s onwards (Budzinski, 2003).1
1 Although European competition laws were mainly introduced as a response to pressures from the US, the
interpretation, the focus and the enforcement tools remained very much distinct (Dumez and Jeunemaitre,
1996).
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As both schools are predisposed towards a capitalist market economy, they
are not mutually exclusive in their tenets. However, they strongly config-
ured different varieties of economic organization.
Underlying the spirit of German ordo-liberal ideas is the perception that
capitalism needs to be organized and economic power controlled (Albert,
1993, pp. 117–19; Streeck, 1997, p. 37). Markets are presumed not to be
self-regulatory, but jeopardized by ‘market failures’, such as the abuse of
excessive market power, restrictive business practices and collusive agree-
ments between corporate actors. Public market intervention in the form of
competition control is conceived necessary for the preservation of an open
and free economic life and in a wider sense also a pluralistic democracy.
Hence, the state should provide for a pro-active and strong institutional
framework that safeguards market players from the anarchy of free markets
and preserves the proviso of a ‘thoroughly and continuously policed com-
petition order’ (Budzinski, 2003, p. 15). In this vein, the concentration of
market power has been propagated as a particularly inhibiting factor for the
diversity and entrepreneurial freedom of SMEs (Albert, 1993, p. 119). The
protection of ‘competitors’ received central attention and was perceived as
a prerequisite for the smooth running of a competitive market structure with
many equally matched players. Thus, even though a company has achieved
a dominant position through competition with others, it might abuse this
position in the future and hinder the unfolding of competitive forces. Rather
than privileging certain interests above others, the competitive order should
serve the economic wellbeing of a broad variety of socio-economic con-
stituencies. Some forms of inter-firm collaboration may be acceptable (or
even desirable), in particular if these serve the diffusion of technology
within the economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 26). The multi-goal and
long-term orientation bestows a philosophical framework for a balanced
interventionist strategy in the administration of anti-competitive conduct,
representing a regulatory analogue of the more generic ‘Rhenish model’ of
a social market economy (see Table 1).
Although the overall influence of German ordo-liberal scholars in other
economic regulatory policies has waned since the 1960s, it continued to
have a remarkable stronghold in EU competition policy (Gerber, 1998;
Budzinski, 2003; Hölscher and Stephan, 2004). The ordo-liberal idea of
public market intervention is reflected in the fact that EU competition laws
were designed to serve primarily the long-term project of market integra-
tion, by also including wider socio-economic policy purposes, such as the
occasional alleviation of employment problems of certain sectors or regions
and the restructuring of ‘sick’ industries (Jarman-Williams, 2001). The
radical doctrine of curbing economic power concentration was never
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realized, the Commission tried to accomplish the ideal of a balanced market
structure by providing SMEs with special protection from fierce competi-
tion through subsidized loans, R&D support and financial guarantees
(Motta, 2004, p. 16). In its 1986 Report, DG Competition formulated its
policy mission in terms of creating an ‘environment within which European
industry can grow and develop [. . .] and at the same take account of social
goals’, while the ‘abusive market power of a few should not undermine the
rights of the many’ (Commission, 1987). This distrust of ‘bigness’ is
revealed in the particular attention given to combating the abuse of domi-
nant market positions at the European level, a prohibition spelled out in
Article 82. Renowned cases are the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas and the
GE-Honeywell mergers, which the Commission initially blocked in 1997
and 2001, respectively. Whereas the US authorities approved the deals
unconditionally, the Commission argued that they would lead to dominant
positions and inhibit market entry for newcomers.
Conversely, the maxims of the Chicago School had a strong influence on
the US antitrust system.2 According to this paradigm’s central tenet, public
market intervention is intrinsically at odds with a free market ideology. As
a monetarist response to Keynesianism, Chicago scholars propagated the
2 The long-term impact of the Chicago School is reflected by the fact that some of its prominent scholars
have been elected as judges at the US Supreme Court and that a vast majority of federal judges has
participated at the Chicago Trainee Program (Schmidt and Rittaler, 1986–82). Moreover, the Chicago
policy recommendations have been encapsulated in the formulation of the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guide-
lines, as well as in the subsequent 1992 revision (Gavil et al., 2002, p. 64).
Table 1: Competition Policy Features of the Rhenish and the Anglo-Saxon Model
Rhenish Model Anglo-Saxon Model
Influential schools of
economic thought
German Ordo-Liberalism
• long-term efficiency
• multiple-goal (i.e. SME
protection; R&D
collaboration)
Chicago School
• short-term efficiency
• single goal (i.e. price
reduction for consumers)
Institutional setup and
enforcement traditions
Civil Law Tradition
• administrative control model
• enforcement by public
authority
• ex-ante authorization
• political and legal reasoning
Common Law Tradition
• court model
• enforcement by (private)
litigation
• ex-post control
• economic reasoning
Source: Authors’ own data.
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deregulation and liberalization of markets (Budzinski, 2003, p. 9). As
markets largely regulate themselves, public market intervention should be
the exception and restricted to the minimum necessary. Henceforth, the
instrument of competition control should focus foremost on the protection
of free competition, rather than ‘competitors’. The ultimate determining
factor for assessing anticompetitive conduct should be consumer welfare
maximization, underpinned by rigorous economic modelling based on neo-
classical price theory – a cornerstone of the Chicago School (Fox, 1997, p.
340). The single goal orientation with regard to mere price reductions for
consumers is reverberated in a short-term view of economic efficiency,
another important yardstick of the Chicago theorem. Following from a
commitment to a ‘survival of the fittest’ logic, it propagates a permissive
attitude towards ‘size’ – provided that prices remain competitive and
‘economies of scale’ can be realized. Market performance is considered
more important than market structure. Consequently, not the concentration
of market power as such, but collusive agreements with clear negative
effects on consumer welfare, cartels and other restrictive business practices
should constitute the focal point of competition control. Long-term eco-
nomic concerns, such as the diffusion of technological innovation through
inter-firm collaboration, do not play an important role in the Anglo-Saxon
variety of competition control (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 31).
Modes of Enforcement: the Anglo-Saxon ‘Common Law’ Tradition Versus
the Continental European ‘Civil Law’ Tradition
Not only the basic guidelines governing competition law differ considerably
between the US and the EU, but also the enforcement practices. Again, these
differences can best be understood in the different institutional arrangements
of the variety of capitalisms. The distinction between the Anglo-Saxon versus
the Rhenish way of enforcement follows in broad lines the contours of the
classification of common versus civil law made by scholars of comparative
law (see Table 1).
The common law tradition underpins the institutional setup of Anglo-
Saxon competition authorities (Gerber, 1998). Competition law enforce-
ment is a case-orientated endeavour in which courts constitute the ultimate
resort for stopping anticompetitive conduct and lengthy judicial precedence
is crucial for the interpretation of its scope and content. In what is generally
referred to as the court model or the ‘bifurcated judicial model’ (Trebilcock
and Iacobucci, 2002), the antitrust agency is merely equipped with
investigatory powers. For instance, in the US, the leading example of a
common law scheme, the Federal enforcement agencies cannot block an
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anticompetitive conduct by themselves, but have to litigate all cases before
the courts likewise to private plaintiffs. Hitherto, more than 90 per cent of
all formal US antitrust actions were brought to the courts by private litiga-
tors (Kemper, 2004, p. 9; Wils, 2003, p. 477). The strong role of private
enforcement in US antitrust prosecution is due to a range of systemic fea-
tures that make it particularly attractive for initiating legal proceedings
against corporations, such as damage compensation, class actions, contin-
gency fees, criminal prosecution and leniency schemes: a successful plain-
tiff in the US can not only be awarded the costs of suing (expert fees and
attorney’s fees), but up to three times the damage suffered (treble damages).
Moreover, plaintiffs can group together and sue collectively (class actions)
and professional litigators may offer contingency fees or sell legal services
under ‘no-win-no-fee’ conditions. In combination with criminal sanctions
(imprisonment of CEOs) and leniency schemes (immunity from prosecution
for those who first confess to having participated in a collusive agreement),
incentives are high to bring antitrust infringements to the US courts. Con-
sequently, the regulation of business conduct relies significantly on ex post
enforcement by private plaintiffs, rendering the US common law tradition a
market-oriented model with ‘private attorney generals’. The basic objectives
of competition policy and the mode of enforcement are closely intertwined.
Both parts of the Anglo-Saxon system rely on the critical notion that public
market intervention should be confined. Moreover, both assume that collu-
sive behaviour should be prosecuted exclusively on the basis that other
market actors clearly were negatively affected. The focus on one decisional
criterion for judging anticompetitive conduct necessarily follows from the
litigation-oriented approach – otherwise the discretionary power of the
courts would be too excessive. Consequently, there is no place for broader
long-term concerns, neither in the policy paradigm, nor in the enforcement,
as private litigants are motivated by short-term profits.
In Continental Europe the civil law tradition is more prominent.
Although judicial precedence increasingly plays a role in the interpretation
of competition laws, competition law enforcement is foremost a ‘clause-
centric’ approach (Hwang, 2004, p. 114), bound to general and abstract
legislation complemented by detailed regulatory frameworks. In civil law
countries, specialized competition authorities, rather than courts, are the
main decision-makers – a model that has been termed the administrative
control model, or ‘integrated agency model’ (Trebilcock and Iacobucci,
2002). Competition authorities tend to be equipped with far-reaching dis-
cretionary powers. Common are regimes of ex ante authorization according
to which companies have to notify agreements to competition authorities in
advance – not only mergers, but also commercial agreements. Due to the
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bureaucratic and administrative character, ex post enforcement by private
litigants is far less important. Courts are merely involved in case market
actors appeal against decisions taken by competition authorities. Again,
competition law principles and the mode of their enforcement are
closely interrelated with the basic institutions of Rhenish capitalism. The
ordo-liberal legacy is reflected in the institutionalization of powerful
public enforcement agencies with wide-ranging enforcement competencies
that ‘order’ the economy and balance the decision-making according to
broader political views. Moreover, the ex ante authorization practice pro-
vides companies with the necessary stability in the pursuance of long-term
strategies.
The traditional EU model of antitrust enforcement constitutes a patent
case of the integrated agency model, following the civil law tradition of its
founding Member States and in particular an approach adapted from
German law (Wilks, 2005, p. 433). The Commission has the authority to act
as an investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner altogether. It can
directly stop a merger or a commercial agreement, impose fines up to 10
per cent of a company’s annual turnover, request modifications of a notified
proposal, or even require the break up of a conglomerate and force it to sell
some of its divisions (Bannerman, 2002, p. 8). There is no other first pillar
policy in which the Commission enjoys similar wide-ranging executive
powers. Its virtual monopoly over EU competition law enforcement and the
absence of facilitating features similar to those of the US explain why
private antitrust litigation, although always possible, never became a widely
applied practice. Compared to the 9:1 private–public enforcement ratio of
the US, the image is reversed in Europe: public authorities enforced 95 per
cent of the competition cases. Only in 5 per cent of the cases did private
actors take the initiative to bring an action to court (Kemper, 2004, p. 9).
The Commission’s multi-goal integration focus manifested itself in the
favourable treatment of SMEs, the permission of inter-firm collaboration in
R&D through a generous system of exemptions, as well as of temporary
government subsidies to rescue industrial sectors in recession, such as coal
and steel, sugar, the motor vehicle or shipbuilding industry. Moreover,
whereas in the US price-fixing and bid-rigging between competitors,
so-called white-collar crimes, were prosecuted under criminal law, in the
EU ‘crisis cartels’ were sporadically permitted in order to allow certain
industries to deal with chronic overcapacities (Fox, 1997, p. 342). Together
with the overwhelmingly administrative character of the notification and a
generous exemption system, the business community could count on a high
degree of legal certainty and public support for the pursuit of long-term
strategies.
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II. The ‘Modernization’ in Perspective: From Rhenish to
Anglo-Saxon Capitalism
Regulation 1/2003
The procedural framework for the application of Article 81 governing the
fight against cartels ‘if trade between the Member States is affected and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market’ has until recently been stipulated in
Regulation 17 dating from 6 February 1962. It ruled that companies with such
a Community dimension could notify to the Commission all kinds of envis-
aged commercial agreements and contractual business practices (other than
mergers), including production and R&D joint ventures, licensing and fran-
chising contracts, marketing and sales agreements, information exchange and
technology transfers. The Commission reviewed each of these notifications
and gave formal ‘clearance’ by either prohibiting the deal, or by granting
individual or block exemptions as specified under 81(3), concerning deals
that ‘promote technical or economic progress’ or ‘improve the production or
distribution of goods’ – two notions that leave ample space for interpretation.
The logic of this system was that everything not permitted was forbidden.
Once the Commission gave its approval or exemption decision, the deal was
automatically immune from legal prosecution. As this created a safe-harbour
procedure for business, it has become conventional practice to notify com-
mercial agreements falling under Article 81, amounting to hundreds of cases
per year (Hwang, 2004).
With the replacement of Regulation 17/62 with Regulation 1/2003 on 1
May 2004, the notification and authorization system for Article 81 has been
abolished. Companies cannot rely anymore on the official approval of the
Commission, but have to assess by themselves whether a business agreement
infringes Article 81(1), or whether the agreement is exempted under 81(3).
Moreover, by declaring the whole of Article 81 together with Article 82 on the
abuse of dominant positions directly applicable, national competition authori-
ties (NCAs) and national courts have to enforce European law in parallel to
their national competition laws for all cases categorized under the rather
elastic notion of ‘affecting cross-border trade’.3 From the perspective of
competence struggles, national jurisdictions will take over a much larger
share of competition enforcement, including major antitrust cases. The decen-
tralization element in Regulation 1/2003, however, distracts from the fact that
3 Although NCAs and national courts could always apply Article 81 (and 82), they could not grant
exemptions, which provided little incentives for national bodies to co-operate in the enforcement of EC
competition law (Jones and Levin, 2003, p. 13).
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the reform has also led to a fundamental shift of competition policy prin-
ciples, with potentially wide-ranging consequences for Rhenish capitalism.
The Move to Anglo-Saxon Competition Law Enforcement
The two institutional dimensions of the recent reform, i.e. the abolishment of
the notification regime for commercial agreements and the devolution of
enforcement competences to the national level fundamentally transform the
way in which anticompetitive agreements are prosecuted at the EU level.
Whereas the notification procedure provided companies with a regime of an
administrative ex ante authorization by a public authority, its abolishment
introduces a system of ex post control based on private self-assessment and
more litigation opportunities for private plaintiffs. Companies are not only
expected to ‘police’ themselves, but also their competitors, distributors and
suppliers by bringing antitrust infringements to the courts – so are consumers.
In combination with the decentralization of the enforcement to the national
level, private plaintiffs can start legal proceedings also before the national
courts – hence court access is made much easier. Thus, the new regime
introduces greater reliance on private ‘market intelligence’ in spotting anti-
competitive practices and less market supervision and intervention by public
authorities. This constitutes a considerable step of convergence towards the
US model, which for commercial agreements never had a similar notification
regime in place.
Factual evidence on the private antitrust litigation referring to Articles 81
and 82 at the national courts in the EU-25 reveals that since the enactment of
Regulation 1/2003 private plaintiffs have indeed made use of their right to
litigate. Already in the first two years a majority of 51 per cent of all national
court judgements was initiated by private plaintiffs (pending judgements
excluded).4 This stands in stark contrast to the situation before the reform,
where only 5 per cent of all competition cases in the EU were brought to the
courts by private actors (see above).
Although the reform does not (yet) touch upon national enforcement
practices, the conversion towards the Anglo-Saxon common law competition
enforcement model is likely to be driven a step further by the introduction of
stronger incentives for private plaintiffs to litigate. Commissioner Kroes is
quite overt in this respect: ‘[. . .] the comprehensive enforcement of the
competition rules is not yet complete – not enough use is made of the courts’
(Kroes, 2005b). Director General Lowe expects a gradual increase in private
suits, which he anticipates to become ‘as effective as in the US, if not more
4 The percentage has been calculated for the time from 1 May 2004 to 10 May 2006 on the basis of the
National Court Cases Database with regard to Articles 81 & 82 of the EC Treaty (Commission, 2006b).
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so’ (Financial Times, 2004, p. 7). DG Competition presented its ideas on how
to ‘increase the scope for private enforcement’ in a Green Paper promoting
the introduction of ‘Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’
(Commission, 2005). The current situation of damage claims for infringe-
ments within the field of EU antitrust rules is noted to present a picture of
‘total underdevelopment’. The Commission proposed 36 possible options
referring to the introduction of an explicit system of damage relief for private
plaintiffs. Hence, the decision for increased private enforcement is likely to
pave the way for further legal modifications at the national level. Jurispru-
dence by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has taken the first step with
regard to damage compensation. In the seminal Courage vs. Crehan decision
of 20 September 2001, it ruled that ‘any individual’ injured from an agree-
ment in violation of Article 81(1) must be able to obtain compensation for the
economic losses suffered from an anticompetitive conduct from the other
party (Gerven, 2005, p. 2; Reich, 2005). As the rulings of the ECJ produce
direct effects, i.e. rights for individuals that can also be evoked before the
national courts, they create the legal basis for damage actions.5 The ECJ’s
pro-active role manifested in its conclusions from the Crehan case: ‘[t]he
existence of [. . .] a litigation right strengthens the working of the Community
competition rules [. . .] [and] actions for damages before the national courts
can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competi-
tion in the Community’ (Schoneveld, 2003, p. 440). Also the Commission
believes that once a system of damage relief is introduced at the Member
State level, private parties will go much further in bringing actions to the
courts than competition authorities (Monti, 2004). Thus, the current discus-
sion on further legal modifications is likely to bring the Rhenish model of
competition law enforcement one crucial step closer to the US-style compe-
tition culture.
A Shift to Anglo-Saxon Competition Policy Principles
The sweeping reform of one of the core pillars of European competition
control not only contains a shift in the mode of regulation (from public to
private enforcement), but also in the substance of regulation (from ordo-
liberalism to the Chicago School). In the EU, much more importance is now
given to short-term consumer welfare considerations, which underpin the
application of a single measure for anticompetitive conduct that can be
entrusted to courts and private litigants. The move away from the public
5 In the EU there have been only 12 competition cases in which damages payment has been awarded since
1962. Only three Member States have damage claim statutory; however, 12 allow such claims (McDavid,
2005).
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multi-goal perspective is further reflected in the reformulation of the Euro-
pean test for concentration, the so-called ‘Dominance Test’, in a way that it
addresses all mergers and co-operative agreements that ‘significantly impede
effective competition’. This comes close to the US ‘Substantive Lessening of
Competition Test’, which implies that as long as mergers or monopolies are
efficient, they should be permitted – even if it is ‘at the expense of competi-
tors’ and if it ‘leads to further market concentration’ (Davidow, 2002, p. 495).
The re-wording of the Dominance Test towards the narrow efficiency concern
– a point of reference that is considered concomitant to consumer welfare by
the Chicago School – radically breaks with the European tradition of pursuing
broader goals in competition law enforcement (e.g. the protection of com-
petitors from the concentrated power of dominant companies).
The 2004 competition reform entails a shift away from the previous
administrative and legalistic approach towards increased use of economic
reasoning as a focal point for decision-making, which constitutes another
crucial point of convergence towards the Chicago model (Hwang, 2004).
Increasingly, rigorous economic analyses underpin antitrust assessments (e.g.
extensive empirical and econometric measurements on product markets and
market shares, simulation models and price calculations, damage analyses).
The growing number of economists in the Commission’s staff members is
reinforcing this trend (McGowan, 2000), so is the establishment of a post
called the Chief Competition Economist tasked with the responsibility of
providing the Commission with ‘independent economic viewpoints’. In com-
bination with private self-enforcement and facilitated court access, however,
large parts of the burden of judging anti-competitive conduct on the basis of
economic evidence will have to be carried by companies and national courts.
On the whole, these features confirm the remark on the reform by James Rill,
former US Deputy Attorney General for Antitrust: it is ‘as close at it could get
to the US-style without copying the whole caboodle’ (Rill, 2003).
Likely Implications for the Future of Rhenish Capitalism within the EU
Given the short implementation period and the incomplete character as
regards further legal modifications, there is no hard empirical evidence yet on
the broader effects of this ‘modernization’. Nonetheless, the ‘varieties of
capitalism’ approach can serve as a basis for informed speculations about
likely consequences. From this perspective, the double shift towards the
Anglo-Saxon model of antitrust policy principles and enforcement threatens
to undermine the very basis of the Rhenish variety of capitalism within the
EU. By giving much more emphasis to short-term consumer welfare and
private enforcement, the Rhenish focus on long-term strategies and broader
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conceptions of economic efficiency will be difficult to maintain. The volatility
induced by private enforcement makes strategic long-term investments or
commercial collaborations more risky. Business is exposed to the risk of
being sued and the consequence of damage payments and, in the worst-case,
hostile take-overs or bankruptcy. With the abolition of individual exemptions,
inter-firm collaboration not covered by block exemptions is made far more
difficult, particularly if only consumer welfare maximization constitutes the
appropriate benchmark.
Together, these changes tend to erode the Rhenish comparative advantages
in high skill and high technology products, which inter alia are based on
incremental innovation sustained by long-term investment. At the same time,
they do not replace the Rhenish model with a viable alternative (i.e. a full shift
to the Anglo-Saxon model), since many features of this variety of capitalism
are neither present, nor necessarily desirable in Continental Europe (e.g.
deregulated labour markets, low-cost hiring and firing, noco-determination
rights). Following the logic of institutional complementarities, however,
hybrid models are inherently unstable, if not unviable. Establishing a pan-
European hybrid is thus more problematic than maintaining either a clear
Anglo-Saxon or a clear Rhenish model (Cernat, 2004, p. 161). Instead, the
continuing diversity of production systems ‘[. . .] is a strength for Europe, not
a weakness, given the comparative advantages of the different national
varieties of capitalism in different industrial sectors’ (Schmidt, 2003, p. 549).
Finally, Anglo-Saxon superiority is not patently obvious, even if a more
pragmatic perspective was chosen: ‘Which is the better strategy: more state
regulation (and hence more civil servants in charge of enforcement) or less
regulation (hence more lawyers to deal with the increase in litigation)?’
(Albert, 1993, p. 10).
In fact large parts of the European business community see more harm
than actual good in the new situation of enhanced litigation possibilities for
private plaintiffs at the national court level. Although ‘a uniform and reliable’
set of competition rules and practices ‘effective throughout the entire EU’
provides companies with a level playing field, corporate actors fear that the
new regime leads to a situation of increased legal insecurity and significant
transaction costs (ICC, 2003). As the legal boundaries between a sales-
strategy and a restrictive vertical agreement are not always straightforward,
private self-assessment becomes a risky enterprise. It means that companies
have to analyse carefully the markets in which they operate, which introduces
new costs with regard to special econometric analyses on market positions,
market shares and financial data. Assessing anticompetitive conduct is not an
exact science and there are no precise guidelines on what accounts as an
infringement. Due to the abolition of the ex ante notification regime, judicial
500 ANGELA WIGGER AND ANDREAS NÖLKE
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
precedent on commercial agreements, especially with regard to sanctioning
and damage awards, still has to come. Early jurisprudence may require its
share of victims until the legal situation is clarified. As outlined above, the
reform is incomplete. The proposed system of private enforcement will only
come to full effect if further measures such as the introduction of specific
provisions on damage rewards and class actions are implemented. Industrial
interests therefore strongly counterbalance efforts for further legal modifica-
tions that enhance the possibilities of litigation (i.e. UNICE, 2006; DIHK,
2006; HDE, 2006; VCI, 2006). US business leaders, represented by US
Chamber of Commerce, have already alerted their European counterparts on
the downside of an excessive litigation culture. With the asbestos cases in
mind, which have cost more than 70,000 jobs, they in particular warn against
the introduction of class actions and high-priced trial lawyers in Europe
(Donohue, 2003).
While the EU is putting much effort in converging towards the US model
of competition control, somewhat ironically, US enforcers have much criti-
cism for their own system (Wils, 2003). Even though US authorities have
traditionally put much effort in narrowing the distance between the European
and the US antitrust model, these efforts have never been directed at promot-
ing the US system of private enforcement (Davidow, 2002, p. 493). In fact, in
response to pressures by the US business community, the Bush administration
is currently even trying to forbid certain litigation practices at the federal
courts in the hope of curtailing a claimant’s culture that has run out of control.
III. From Brussels to Chicago: the Politics of Private Regulation
The reform was conducted under the realm of the reinvigorated discourses on
the Lisbon agenda. Private enforcement of competition law is reasoned to
contribute to the ‘competition for competitiveness strategy’ by raising the
awareness of competitors and consumers on competition law infringements.
The mere threat of private litigation should cause sufficient deterrence to
achieve ultimately a better compliance with European competition law
(Monti, 2004; see also Kroes, 2005a). In contrast, the previous notification
system is perceived to be overly inefficient, thereby wasting valuable staff
resources.
As demonstrated above, however, the positive implications of these reforms
for the comparative advantages of the European economy are less sure, at least
in the case of the Rhenish variety of capitalism. A politico-economic assess-
ment of the immediate consequences of competition policy reforms adds some
further doubts on the official ‘efficiency’ tale by identifying three types of
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actors that benefit most substantially from recent measures, namely the Com-
mission, the legal profession and shareholder interests.
The Commission’s Broader Agenda – Brokering Integration in Competition
Matters
In addition to shifting the centre of gravity from public authorities to private
market players, the reform was intended to allow the Commission to
strengthen its grasp on national competition policy (see also Wilks, 2005).
Through making the whole of Articles 81 and 82, governing the fight
against cartels and the abuse of dominant positions, directly applicable, two
birds were killed with one stone. First, next to offering private litigants
more opportunities to bring legal actions to national courts, it anticipates an
increase in the credibility and legitimacy of the European competition law
enforcement, which in the past has fiercely been criticized as being a
bastion of uncontrollable Commission power. Second, the re-allocation of
competences constitutes an attempt to catalyse intra-EU convergence in a
field where accomplishing a fully-fledged harmonization has never been
politically feasible. The establishment of the European Competition
Network (ECN) is one of the key supporting features in this regard. Within
this framework, the NCAs and the national courts are required to co-operate
with their European counterparts, co-ordinate the investigation and prosecu-
tion of restrictive business agreements and exchange information. From an
integrationist perspective, one could easily conclude that the ECN provides
a mode of governance in which national jurisdictions are structurally inte-
grated into the European model. Although competition authorities and
courts have already co-operated before on a more informal basis, the ECN
introduces a more formal way of co-operation. Article 11(6) in combination
with Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 have conveyed extensive controlling
functions to the Commission, such as the right to intervene and withdraw
proceedings in case conflicting decisions are expected, i.e. ‘decisions
running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission’ – a stipulation
that provides considerable room for interpretation. The well-established
NCAs have fiercely criticized the prospect that the Commission can theo-
retically trespass, deviating national proceeding. In particular, in Germany
the reform has led to an intensive academic expert debate. Officials from
the longstanding ordoliberal camp feared that they would become ‘semi-
autonomous vassals’ of the Commission (Bannerman, 2002, p. 38; Mest-
mäcker, 1999; Möschel, 2001; Deringer, 2003). In this regard the reform
displays also signs of a process of ‘European integration through the back-
door’, as there is only one common reference point towards which NCAs
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are allowed to converge, that is the EU model. The preamble of Regulation
1/2003 is straightforward in this respect. It says that the goal of the mod-
ernization is ‘to establish a renewed system which ensures that competition
in the common market is not distorted and that Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty are applied effectively and uniformly throughout the commu-
nity’. Nevertheless, under the previous monopoly position of the Commis-
sion with regard to cases with a community-dimension, NCAs found
themselves marginalized in the prosecution of smaller antitrust cases.
With the decentralization prompted by Regulation 1/2003, the enforcement
powers of national authorities have also increased substantially, which
explains why it was possible to have the reform adopted by the Council.
As the DG Competition is unlikely to supervise NCAs comprehensively
and national courts in the EU-27, powerful national competition authorities,
such as the German Bundeskartellamt and the British Office of Fair
Trading (OFT), are likely to maintain their own course in competition law
enforcement.
Notwithstanding, the heterogeneously structured national jurisdictions
and the distinct procedural practices may also raise the potential for conflict,
something the Commission is very well aware of, as it is currently financing
specific competition law training for more than 700 national judges in order
to streamline the jurisdictional enforcement (Commission, 1996). The strat-
egy entails that in a two-tier system, in which NCAs and national courts have
to apply national and European laws in tandem, the prospect for clearing the
way for European-wide laws and practices increases. It constitutes an opening
move by the Commission for diminishing the significance of national com-
petition laws and bringing the EU one step closer to a common competition
culture – one that increasingly privileges private enforcement. This move has
been described as an ‘extraordinary coup’ (Wilks, 2005, p. 437) by the
Commission, since it not only ‘Europeanizes’ the national competition
regimes under the misleading heading of ‘decentralization’, but also effec-
tively hides this effect behind a ‘facade of administrative functionality and
legal necessity’ (Wilks, 2005, p. 437).
The Stakes of the Legal Profession
The liberal professions such as lawyers, accountants, tax consultants or
notaries are frequently underrated as political actors. Organized in associa-
tions or bars aiming at the protection of the profession’s good reputation,
they regulate on a national level the conditions of entry, establishment and
education and set the margins of tariffs for particular services and restrict
the scope of activity and, at times, even advertising. Their main function is
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to safeguard and, if possible, extend their jurisdiction, usually to the dis-
advantage of adjacent professions (McDonald, 1995). Currently, there is
much pressure from transnationally organized law companies to enhance
the level of inter-professional competition by liberalizing the protected pro-
fessions in Europe. With a stake in offering a combination of legal and
advisory services from different professional disciplines, law companies
seek not only a harmonization of legal practices between different national
settings, but also new markets for their multidisciplinary services. Corre-
spondingly, private practioners specialized in Community law and their bars
from both EU and non-EU law societies have constituted an important force
in shaping the course of the new regime. As regular and influential guests
at the preparatory stages of the reform, they displayed their expertise in the
form of lengthy advisory reports to Commission officials and pushed
strongly for harmonized rules and enhanced private litigation possibilities in
competition cases.6
The US experience with private self-enforcement depicts best the motiva-
tional grounds for the involvement of private antitrust counsellors in defining
the course of European competition law: it simply constitutes their ‘bread and
butter’ (Calvani, 2004, p. 18). As not many corporate actors possess in-house
expertise in competition matters, the demand for legal services offered by law
and/or other professional services companies increases. Next to navigating
companies through legal actions with specialized litigators, professional ser-
vices companies are provided with a market for judicial advocacy, tailor-
made compliance programmes and specific market analyses. Hence, private
enforcement in competition matters is providing companies specialized in
competition questions with a major additional source of income. The
US-style litigation system demonstrates that often more than half of the
compensation awards of legal actions against anticompetitive conduct disap-
pear into the pockets of professional litigators.7 Against the background of
Bush’s anti-litigation stance, rent-seeking US law companies increasingly
lobby for the necessary legal prerequisites at the respective jurisdictions in
order to expand the lucrative market for legal services into Europe. The legal
6 Exemplary is a study conducted by the law company Ashurst on behalf of the European Commission’s
DG Competition, which forms the basis for the Green Paper on Damage Actions. It identifies major judicial
obstacles in EU Member States and puts forth a range of suggestions for national reforms that aim at
facilitating private enforcement, including the introduction of US-style class actions.
7 This can end up in bizarre outcomes, such as reported by credit cardholder Brian M. Carney, who has
been awarded $30,000 in the class action case Schwartz v. Citibank. He has not been informed about the
trial nor has been aware about having been treated unfairly, nor has he given his permission to sue in his
name the Citibank for a late processing of payments. ‘His’ lawyers, however, garnered $9 million of the
$18 million compensation payment (Carney, 2005).
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community – including representatives from across the Atlantic – contributed
a vast number of positive and detailed responses to the Commission’s Green
Paper on how to increase private enforcement in Europe (Commission,
2006a).
Claims for More Market Justice: the Shareholder Value Perspective
Shareholder rights organizations ‘bandwagon’ onto these developments.
Recent corporate scandals such as Enron, Parmalat and Ahold have height-
ened the demand for increased ‘market justice’. With a stake not only in
antitrust litigation, but also different types of securities fraud, shareholder
rights organizations and institutional investors have long requested legal
reforms such as the introduction of class action lawsuits in Europe (Hollinger,
2005; Sherwood and Tait, 2005). In combination with criminal sanctions,
class actions provide an opportunity for shareholder plaintiffs to compel the
resignation of ‘traitorous’ CEOs and ultimately influence the composition of
management. In this respect, the competition overhaul and its offshoot of
further legal modifications finds itself at the cutting edge of corporate
governance reforms in Europe, which aim at strengthening the position of
shareholders vis-à-vis management. Although a company’s involvement in
antitrust investigations can negatively impact on the value of stocks, investors
have a clear stake in altering the balance of power within companies to their
benefit. Correspondingly, investors’ associations and the financial press have
warmly supported the recent reform in EU competition policy.
Conclusion
The Trend Towards an Enhanced Role of Private Actors in EU Business
Regulation
The article has demonstrated that current changes in EU antitrust regulation
can be understood as a substantial shift from the Rhenish to the Anglo-Saxon
variety of capitalism. From this theoretical perspective, changes in policy
goals and enforcement practices threaten to undermine the comparative
advantages of the organized market economies within the Union. Short-term
efficiency considerations are likely to take precedence over wider socio-
economic concerns, such as the protection of SMEs or technology transfer
through inter-firm collaboration. Not only the substance of antitrust regula-
tion, but also its mode has been attuned with the laissez-faire variety of
capitalism, in which regulatory tasks are delegated to private (professional)
actors.
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Current changes in EU antitrust regulation cannot be ascribed to the
efficiency pressures of economic globalization. Nor have political pressures
from the US coerced the EU into these reforms. Rather, they reflect a con-
scious attempt of the Commission to further harmonize antitrust matters
within the Union. While a direct assault on the vestiges of national regulation
would have been politically obstructed, the alliance with professional orga-
nizations and shareholder interests finally proved successful. Regulation
1/2003 is nearly entirely based on the 1999 Modernization White Paper by the
Commission that was accepted without any major modification by the
Council, in spite of its far-reaching consequences. The expertise provided by
legal specialists played a crucial role in persuading the representatives of the
Member States (Wilks, 2005, pp. 435 and 447).
Arguably, the allocation of regulatory tasks to private actors is an impor-
tant component within this strategy. Because of its presumably professional
and technical character, so-called ‘privatized’ regulation is difficult to attack
on political grounds. At the same time, the use of an apolitical image serves
to hide the wider consequences of the new regulation, thereby preventing the
mobilization of negatively affected groups. Finally, the ‘dinosaur’ of the
administrative notification system is hard to defend in the current intellectual
climate – a climate where the replacement of public by private agencies is
conceived to be more efficient in many countries and sectors.
The increasing role of private actors in business regulation, as well as its
causes and consequences, is not limited to the issue of competition law
enforcement alone, but provides a crucial case for a much broader trend
within the European Union. Exemplary are the policy areas of accounting and
banking supervision.
The Private Regulation of Accounting
Since 1 January 2005, all stock exchange listed companies in the EU have
to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as designed by
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Whereas accounting
standards have previously been set at a national level by nationally consti-
tuted actors from the public or private sector, the process will now be
managed internationally by a London-based organization whose parent
foundation is a private company incorporated in Delaware and mainly
financed by the Big Four accounting firms. Not only the mode of regulation
has changed with the introduction of IFRS, but also its substance. Similar
to competition policy, accounting standards are not neutral towards different
models of capitalism (Perry and Nölke, 2006). The rather conservative,
debtor-oriented accounting standards of the German ‘Handelsgesetzbuch’
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that can be attributed to the strong role of the German banks within Rhenish
capitalism have now given way to more investor-friendly Anglo-Saxon stan-
dards. The introduction of IFRS will make long-term investments based on
hidden reserves more difficult to defend against demands for a short-term
return on company capital. The driving forces of this process are similar to
those in the field of competition policy: shareholder interests, professional
service firms (the Big Four), as well as national and international associa-
tions of accountants (Dewing and Russell, 2004, pp. 310–11). The Com-
mission appreciates the opportunity for the introduction of unified EU
accounting standards, regardless of the affinity between IFRS and Anglo-
Saxon capitalism. Earlier attempts at a European harmonization of account-
ing standards instigated by the Commission, such as the two directives on
accounting regulation of 1978 and 1983, were clearly less successful.
Again, the decision for Anglo-Saxon standards cannot solely be attributed
to external pressures, since the US regulators have chosen not to recognize
the IFRS standards, but rather stick to their own Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), at least for the time being (Dewing and
Russell, 2004, pp. 311–12).
The Incorporation of Private Actors in Banking Regulation
Similar observations can be made in the case of banking regulation, in which
bond rating analysts constitute a central force in the shift towards private
business regulation. The EU is in the process of adapting the proposed Basel
II rules for banking supervision (Lütz, 2002, p. 202), which mandate rating
agency outputs for less sophisticated banks. Although rating competition has
intensified since the 1990s, the two major US-based agencies of Moody’s
Investor Service and Standard&Poor’s still largely dominate this profession.
Private third-party enforcement of debt rating has an extensive history in the
US (Sinclair, 2005; Kerwer, 2005; Mattli and Büthe, 2005). Correspondingly,
rating agencies favour the Anglo-Saxon model within their operations,
including a rather short-term investment horizon and a preponderance of
investor concerns. These most recent developments may further undermine
the Rhenish model, in particular with regard to the financial basis of ‘Mittel-
stand’ companies, one of the backbones of Rhenish capitalism. Due to the
limited level of internally generated funds and the strong reliance on debt
financing for investment, the German SMEs are currently threatened in their
core operation. Basle II and the increasing role of rating agencies make it
difficult for highly indebted companies. Following from their risk profile,
credit costs considerably increase – a process that has already been set in
motion during recent years. Many of these companies may be forced to
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mobilize funding by ‘going public’ or selling shares to private equity com-
panies (Lütz, 2002, p. 198). This may lead to further pressures of ‘short-
termism’ that are not compatible with the Rhenish model. Again, there is a
certain irony involved here, since the US has reserved for itself a right to
exempt certain groups of banks from the Basel II rules, although this regu-
lation is very much embedded in the more generic Anglo-Saxon model. The
Commission, in contrast, makes good use of the opportunity for a harmonized
banking supervision within the Union, even if it undermines an important
element within Rhenish capitalism.
‘Isn’t it Ironic, Don’t You Think?’
There are several signs of convergence in European business regulation
towards the US model which are driven by the EU (Dewing and Russell,
2004, pp. 311–12). In all cases, the Commission was one of the core drivers
of a process that is to the benefit of (US-based) professional service firms, US
institutional investors and the Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism more gen-
erally. It is not without irony that at the same time the US regulators have
decided to stick to their own regulatory framework (GAAP/accounting, carve
outs in Basle II), or even reverse the direction of the reforms that the EU is
taking (class actions, litigation culture). But current EU reforms may under-
mine the comparative advantages of the very variety of capitalism that can be
found in large parts of Continental Europe. Both the shift in the mode of
regulation (an increasing emphasis on private professional organizations) and
in its substance (an increasing affinity with Anglo-Saxon economic reason-
ing) are instrumental in this regard.
The privatization of certain facets of EU business regulation has gained
ground through a deliberately depoliticized, professions-based interest con-
stellation that disregards more eminent political features of this form of
economic organization (Dewing and Russell, 2004, p. 300). It should not be
a surprise that attempts by the EU to introduce Anglo-Saxon standards in
the form of public regulations, such as the European Works Council Direc-
tive, the European Company Statute Directive and the 13th Takeover Direc-
tive, have led to somewhat uneasy compromises, given the high visibility of
these issues and the corresponding political controversy (Cernat, 2004). In
contrast, the private-authority based regulations discussed in this article
have led to a clear decision in favour of the Anglo-Saxon model. While
more explicit political attacks on the basic institutions of Rhenish capital-
ism are not (yet) feasible, the enhanced role of private actors in EU regu-
lation increases the chances for the erosion of these institutions – ‘through
the back door’.
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